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Abstract
Neural networks achieve outstanding accuracy in classification and regression
tasks. However, understanding their behavior still remains an open challenge that
requires questions to be addressed on the robustness, explainability and reliability
of predictions. We answer these questions by computing reachable sets of neural
networks, i.e. sets of outputs resulting from continuous sets of inputs.
We provide two efficient approaches that lead to over- and under-approximations
of the reachable set. This principle is highly versatile, as we show. First, we
analyze and enhance the robustness properties of both classifiers and regression
models. This is in contrast to existing works, which only handle classification.
Specifically, we verify (non-)robustness, propose a robust training procedure, and
show that our approach outperforms adversarial attacks as well as state-of-the-
art methods of verifying classifiers for non-norm bound perturbations. We also
provide a technique of distinguishing between reliable and non-reliable predictions
for unlabeled inputs, quantify the influence of each feature on a prediction, and
compute a feature ranking.
1 Introduction
Neural networks are widely used in classification and regression tasks. However, understanding their
behavior remains an open challenge and raises questions concerning the robustness, reliability and
explainability of their predictions. We address these issues by studying the principle of reachable sets
of neural networks: Given a set of inputs, what is the set of outputs of the neural network.
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Figure 1: Reachable set over-/under-
approximation.
Methods that compute an exact reachable set [29] are
not feasible, even for tiny neural networks [15]. In this
study, we aim to approximate the reachable set such
that it can be computed for neural networks used on
standard data sets such as MNIST. More specifically, we
investigate this problem in the context of ReLU neural
networks, which constitute the most widely used class
of networks. To allow flexibility regarding inputs, we
propagate a set of points defined by a zonotope through
the neural network. As the ReLU operation can result
in non-convex sets, the output of the ReLU function
is under-approximated or over-approximated for each
layer. The resulting sets are used to analyze and enhance neural network properties (see Section 4).
Overall, our main contributions are: (i) Two efficient approaches RsO and RsU (Reachable set Over-
and Under-approximation) of approximating the reachable set of a neural network; (ii) Classification:
Preprint. Under review.
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Techniques of applying RsU and RsO to (non-)robustness verification, robust training, comparison
with attacks, and state-of-the-art verification methods. (iii) Regression: an approach for analyzing and
enhancing the robustness properties of regression models. (iv) Explainability/Reliability: a method
of distinguishing between reliable and non-reliable predictions as well as a technique of quantifying
and ranking features w.r.t. their influence on a prediction.
2 Related Work
Reachable Sets. Computing the exact reachable set of a neural network as [29] is not applicable even
with tiny networks, as shown in [15]. Some techniques that approximate reachable sets, such as [19],
cannot handle the common robustness definition. Most approaches that deal with the reachable sets of
a neural network emerged from robustness verification. The study that is the most closely related to
our over-approximation approach RsO is [5]. Further developments of this technique include bounds
[20, 21, 22]. In addition, set-based approaches are used for robust training [17, 8]. Our work goes
significantly beyond the existing approaches. First, our over-approximations are (by construction)
subsets of the ones computed in [5] and thus tighter. Second, in addition to over-approximations,
we provide an approach for under-approximating the reachable set. Third, in comparison to the
improvements presented in [20, 21, 22], our approaches do not require bounds on the layer input.
(Non-)Robustness Verification. Reachable sets are applicable to (non-)robustness verification (see
Section 3). Other robustness verification approaches search for adversarial examples by solving the
constrained optimization problem of finding a sample that is close to the input, but labeled differently.
The search space, i.e. an over-approximation of the reachable set of the neural network is defined
by the constraints. The distance of the samples to an input point is usually bound by a norm that
the optimization problem can deal with, such as L∞-norm [28, 18, 1, 12, 23] or L2-norm [10]. One
drawback of these approaches is the strong norm-based restriction on the inputs. Our approaches
can handle input sets equivalent to norms as well as input sets that couple features and thus allow
complex perturbations like different brightness of pictures to be analyzed.
The complement of robustness verification are adversarial attacks, i.e. points close to an input that
are assigned a different label. Adversarial attacks compute a single point within the reachable set,
without explicitly computing the reachable set. There are various ways of designing attacks, one
of the strongest being the projected gradient descent attack (PGD) [16]. In contrast to adversarial
attacks, our RsU approach aims to find an entire set of predictions corresponding to an input set.
It should be noted that, all the above principles are designed for classification tasks. In contrast, our
approach is naturally convenient for regression as well. To further highlight the versatility of our
method, we show how to apply it to explaining predictions, including the aspect of reliability.
3 Reachable Sets of Neural Networks
The reachable setO w.r.t. an input set I of a neural network f is its output set, i.e. O = {f(x) | x ∈ I}.
Computing the exact reachable set of a neural network is challenging, as proving simple properties of
a neural network is already an NP-complete problem [12]. Under-approximations Oˆu ⊆ O produce a
set of points that can definitely be reached with respect to the input, while over-approximations cover
all points that might possibly be reached O ⊆ Oˆo (see Figure 1).
We propose approximating the reachable set by propagating the input set layer-by-layer through the
neural network. In each layer, the input set is first subjected to the linear transformation defined
by weights and bias. This linear transformation is computed exactly and efficiently for the set
representations we exploit. Then, the ReLU activation function is applied. Since applying ReLU
onto a convex set can result in a non-convex set, we approximate convex subsets. Specifically,
we propose an analytical solution for the over-approximations and an efficient linear optimization
problem formulation for the under-approximations.
Definition of Input Sets. Our approaches operate directly on sets and require an efficient and flexible
set representation. For this, we use zonotopes, as they are closed under linear transformation and their
G-representation provides a compact representation in high-dimensional spaces. Furthermore, they
allow complex and realistic perturbations to be defined that couple input features such as different
light conditions on pictures (in short: we go beyond simple norm constraints).
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(a) ReLU(Z). (b) Under-approximation (green). (c) Over-approximation (orange).
Figure 2: Application of ReLU to a zonotope (blue) and approximation the outcome.
The G-representation of a d-dimensional zonotope Zˆ with n generators is defined by a row-vector,
the center cˆ ∈ Rd and a matrix Gˆ ∈ Rn×d. The rows of this matrix contain the generators gˆi. The set
of all points within Zˆ is:
Zˆ = (cˆ | Gˆ) :=
{
cˆ+
n∑
i=1
βˆigˆi | βˆi ∈ [−1, 1]
}
⊂ Rd. (1)
Propagating Sets through ReLU Networks. In this paper we focus on ReLU neural networks, as
they are not only widely used but also powerful. A neural network consists of a series of functional
transformations, in which each layer l (of nl neurons) receives the input x ∈ Rnl−1 and produces
the output by first subjecting the input to a linear transformation defined by the weights W l and
bias bl, and then applying ReLU. In the final layer, no activation function is applied, and the output
stays in the logit-space. Thus, starting with the input set Zˆ0 a series of alternating operations is
obtained: Zˆ0
W 1,b1→ Z1 ReLU→ Zˆ1 W
2,b2→ Z2 ReLU→ . . . W
L,bL→ ZL, where Zl denotes the set after the
linear transformation, Zˆl denotes the set after the ReLU, and ZL is the reachable set (output layer).
Since zonotopes are closed under linear transformations, applying weights and bias of layer l to
zonotope Zˆl−1 = (cˆl−1 | Gˆl−1) results in
Zl =
(
cl | Gl) = (W lcˆl−1 + bl | Gˆl−1W lT) . (2)
Obtaining ReLU(Zl) is challenging, as it may be a non-convex set, as illustrated in Figure 2a. It is
inefficient to further propagate the non-convex set ReLU(Zl) through the neural network. Therefore,
our core idea is to approximate ReLU(Zl) and use this as the input to the next layer. More precisely,
we propose two methods: RsO (reachable set over-approximation) and RsU (reachable set under-
approximation). RsO obtains a superset of ReLU(Zl) in each layer l, while RsU returns a subset.
Using RsO within each layer ensures that no points are missed and that the output set captures all
reachable points. Equivalently, applying RsU within each layer results in an output set that is a subset
of the exact reachable set, i.e. contains the points that will definitely be reached.
Approximation of ReLU(Z). In the following, we describe how to approximate ReLU(Z) based
on zonotope Z. To unclutter the notiation, we omit layer index l. The ReLU function maps
points dimension-wise onto the maximum of themselves and zero. Consideration of dimension d
results in three possible cases: Case 1: ∀p ∈ Z : pd < 0, where the points are mapped to
zero, Case 2: ∀p ∈ Z : pd ≥ 0, where the points are mapped onto themselves and Case 3:
∃p, q ∈ Z : pd < 0 ∧ qd > 0, where the points are mapped to zero or themselves.
Case 3 causes the non-convexity of ReLU (see Figure 2a, 2nd dimension). We consider the three
cases separately to approximate each maximum convex subset of ReLU(Z) by one zonotope. The
three cases are distinguished by computing an index set for each case:
Rn = {d | ∀p ∈ Z : pd < 0}, Rp = {d | ∀p ∈ Z : pd ≥ 0}, R = {d | ∃p, q ∈ Z : pd < 0, qd > 0}
(3)
These index sets can be efficiently obtained through the interval hull of Z [13], where |.| is the
element-wise absolute value: IH (Z) := [c− δg, c+ δg] where δg = ∑i |gi|. Rn contains the
dimensions d such that (c − δg)d ≤ 0, Rp contains the dimensions where (c + δg)d ≥ 0, and R
contains the remaining dimensions.
Projection of a Zonotope. Regarding the dimensions in Rn, ReLU maps each point of the zonotope
to zero. Thus, we can safely project the whole zonotope Z = (c | G) to zero within these dimensions.
Theorem 1. Let Z be an arbitrary zonotope and Z ′ = ProjRn(Z), then ReLU(Z) = ReLU(Z
′).
Here ProjM (Z) = Z
′ = (c′ | G′) where c′d =
{
0 if d ∈M
cd else
, g′i,d =
{
0 if d ∈M
gi,d else
(4)
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All proofs are given in the Appendix. Projecting Z results in the more compact Z ′ with no change to
the output set. We overload notation, and Z denotes the projected zonotope in the following.
Computation of Quadrants that Contain a Subset Sk of Z. Next, we subdivide the projected
zonotope Z into subsets located in one quadrant. Quadrants that contain points of Z are determined
by an index set Rk, where Rk is an element of the power set P(R) of R. Each index set Rk
corresponds to a set Sk = {p | p ∈ Z ∧pd ≤ 0∀d ∈ Rk∧pd ≥ 0∀ /∈ Rk}. Clearly, all Sk are convex
and disjoint, the union over Sk results in Z. It is important to highlight that we never materialize
the subsets Sk, as they are unfavorable to compute. Our core idea is to approximate each Sk by
zonotope Zˆk. Subsequently, we project Zˆk in all dimensions of the corresponding Rk (see case 1),
resulting in ProjRk(Zˆk). The obtained set of zonotopes is an approximatiuon of ReLU(Z) and is
the input for the next layer. An example of the computation of R,Rk, Sk is given in the Appendix.
We capture each Sk individually to keep the approximations as tight as possible. Theoretically,
we could decrease the number of zonotopes by over-approximating several Sk by one zonotope or
by not considering small subsets Sk in the case of under-approximation. We discuss an extension
that restricts the maximum number of zontopes in the Appendix. This extension enables a balance
between tightness of approximations and run-time, which is useful for larger neural networks. The
approximation of Sk can be either an over-approximation (RsO) or an under-approximation (RsU).
Over-approximation of ReLU(Z). Given Sk ⊆ Z, we aim to over-approximate Sk by Zˆk = (cˆ | Gˆ)
(to unclutter the notation, we omit the index k w.r.t. center and generators). Our core idea is that if Zˆk
is a tight over-approximation of Sk, the shape of Zˆk should resemble the shape of Z (see Figure 2c).
c
cˆ
e
t+2,2
t+1,1
Figure 3: Approxima-
tion of S0 ⊆ Z by Zˆ.
As the shapes of two zonotopes are similar if their generators point in similar
directions, we derive Zˆk from the generators of Z. More precisely, the
generators of Zˆk are obtained by scaling each generator gj of Z with a
factor αj ∈ [0, 1] and computing the shift of the center such that Sk ⊆
Zˆk ⊆ Z. Clearly, αj = 1 fulfills this property, but results in gˆj = g and a
loose over-approximation. Thus, we aim to minimize over αj . Each scaling
factor αj for generator gj is computed analytically (see Figure 3) by first
computing an extreme point e of the zonotope. We start in e and test if
the generator gj allows a point tj to be reached outside the quadrant under
consideration. If this is the case, gj can be scaled down and Zˆ still over-
approximates Sk. We compute the extreme points and scaling factors for
each dimension d, resulting in αj,d.
Regarding dimension d, gj can be scaled by the factor αj,d. If we scale gj by a larger factor, we leave
the quadrant corresponding to Sk with respect to dimension d. A larger scaling factor is not necessary
in order to over-approximate Sk. Thus, we minimize over αj,d to obtain the smallest αj and the
tightest over-approximation. Formally, gˆj and cˆ of the over-approximating zonotope Zˆk are:
gˆj = αjgj , cˆ = c+
∑
j
sj(1− αj)ojgj with the following definitions :
αj = min
d
αj,d, d
∗ = arg min
d
αj,d, oj =
gj,d∗
|gj,d∗ | , sj = 1 if d
∗ /∈ Rk,−1 else
∀d /∈ Rk : t+j,d = cd − 2 |gj,d|+
∑
i
|gi,d| , and ∀d ∈ Rk : t−j,d = cd + 2 |gj,d| −
∑
i
|gi,d|
∀d /∈ Rk : αj,d = 1−
|t+j,d|
2|gj,d| if t
+
j,d < 0, 1 else, ∀d ∈ Rk : αj,d = 1−
|t−j,d|
2|gj,d| if t
−
j,d > 0, 1 else
(5)
Although the generators of Z are scaled down, the obtained zonotope Zˆ is an over-approximation
of Sk for the respective quadrant (which we never computed explicitly):
Theorem 2. Let Z = (c | G), Sk = {p | p ∈ Z ∧ pd ≥ 0 ∀d /∈ Rk ∧ pd ≤ 0 ∀d ∈ Rk}
and Zˆk = (cˆ | Gˆ) with the center and generators as defined in Equation 5. Then Sk ⊆ Zˆk.
The subset Sk is located in one quadrant and the corresponding Rk contains dimensions that are
mapped to zero by ReLU (case 1 on Sk). Thus, we project the over-approximation Zˆk in dimensions
d ∈ Rk as described above. This projection is exact: ReLU(Sk) = ProjRk(Sk) ⊆ ProjRk(Zˆk).
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Under-approximation of ReLU(Z). Under-approximating Sk turns out to be more challenging. We
propose to tackle this by solving a constrained optimization problem, in which we aim to find a
zonotope Zˆk of maximum volume subject to the constraint Zˆk ⊆ Sk:
Zˆk = arg max
Zˆ
V (Zˆ) subject to Zˆ ⊆ Sk (6)
How can we instantiate Equation 6 to under-approximate Sk tightly and keep computations efficient?
We derive an efficient linear program by considering the same search domain as before. More
precisely, we constrain the search space to zonotopes that are derived from the original zonotope Z,
by scaling its generators gi by factors αi ∈ [0, 1], i.e. gˆi = αigi. As motivated before, this assumption
is reasonable, since Zˆk and Z have similar shapes.
Importantly, to ensure that we under-approximate a part of Z located in one quadrant, we add
a constraint that forces the lower bound of the interval hull of Zˆ to be non-negative if d /∈ Rk:
cˆd −
∑
i |gˆi,d| ≥ 0 ∀d /∈ Rk and one that forces the upper bound of the interval hull of Zˆ to be
negative if d ∈ Rk: cˆd +
∑
i |gˆi,d| ≤ 0 ∀d ∈ Rk. Since the volume of the zonotope grows with αi,
we instantiate the objective function by
∑
i αi. Combining all of these considerations results in the
following linear optimization problem:
α∗, δ∗ = arg max
α,δ
∑
i
αi subject to gˆi = αigi, αi ∈ [0, 1] , cˆ = c+
∑
i
δigi, |δi| ≤ 1− αi
cˆd −
∑
i
|gˆi,d| ≥ 0 ∀d /∈ Rk, cˆd +
∑
i
|gˆi,d| ≤ 0 ∀d ∈ Rk
Theorem 3. Let Zˆk be computed from zonotope Z based on α∗, δ∗, then Zˆk ⊆ Sk.
If the quadrant under consideration is empty (which can happen for many quadrants) the optimization
problem is not solvable and we can safely ignore this quadrant. Since all points in Zˆk are negative
w.r.t. the dimensions d ∈ Rk (case 1), we compute ProjRk(Zˆk) and obtain an under-approximation
of ReLU(Sk). See Figure 2b for illustration.
4 Applications and Experiments
We highlight the versatility of our RsO and RsU approach by describing several applications in
classification and regression tasks. More specifically, we discuss (non-)robustness verification, robust
training, quantification of feature importance and the distinction between reliable and non-reliable
predictions. Our input zonotopes capture three different shapes: cube (equivalent to L∞-norm),
box (with a different perturbation on each feature) and free (with coupling of features). We train
feed-forward ReLU networks on standard data sets such as MNIST. A detailed description of the
datasets, network architectures, experimental setups and additional experimental results are provided
in the Appendix.
Classification: (Non-)Robustness Verification. First, we evaluate the potential of reachable sets by
using them for robustness/non-robustness verification, i.e. for studying how predictions of a classifier
change when perturbing input instances. More precisely, we aim to analyze if predictions based
on an input set map to the same class or if they vary. Formally, the set of predictions (classes) is
P = {arg maxc f(x)c|x ∈ I}, given input set I .
For verification, we compute a robustness score against each class. Let a be the predicted class and
b 6= a the class against which we quantify robustness.1 The least robust point p within the reachable
set (output/logit space) is the one where its coordinate pb is close to or larger than pa. Based on these
considerations, we define the robustness score against class b of reachable set RS :
sb = min
p∈RS
(pa − pb) = min
Z=(c|G)∈RS
(
ca − cb −
∑
i
∣∣gai − gbi ∣∣
)
(7)
where Z ∈ RS denotes the computed zonotopes, and we use that pa = ca +
∑
i βig
a
i , pb =
cb +
∑
i βig
b
i and
∑
i βi(g
a
i − gbi ) is minimal if βi ∈ {−1, 1} depending on the sign of gai − gbi .
1Please note that reachable sets capture all classes jointly. More precisely, the method does not require any
label/class information at all. Thus, it is directly applicable to other tasks such as regression.
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Robustness certificates are obtained by computing the scores against all classes b 6= a on the over-
approximated reachable set RSO. If all scores are positive, the robustness certificate holds, and
all points from the input set are classified as class a. Non-robustness certificates are obtained by
checking if there is a class b, such that sb on the under-approximated reachable set RSU is negative.
If this is the case, at least one point from the input set is categorized as class b.
There are three benefits to these scores. First, computing scores is efficient (see Equation 7). What is
more, the scores are fully differentiable w.r.t. the network parameters, enabling immediate robust
training (see later experiment). Second, the scores are applicable to class-specific verification (i.e.
robust against class b1, non-robust against b2). And thirdly, the scores allow relative quantification of
(non-)robustness. A reachable set with a high score is more robust than one with a low score.
We compare the performance of RSO on robustness verification using the state-of-the-art methods,
WK [28], dz [20], dp [21], dr [22] and es [29], which computes the exact reachable set (implementa-
tion [15]). RsU is compared with the success rate of FGSM attacks [6, 25] and PGD attacks [16].
To handle the box setting, FGSM attacks are scaled, such that the perturbed input is contained
within the input zonotope. The PGD attack is projected onto the input zonotope in each step,
i.e. extended to handle arbitrary input zonotopes. Figure 4 illustrates (non-)robustness verifica-
tion on the cancer data set (2 hidden layers), MNIST (1 hidden layer) and iris data set (5 hidden
layers) for cube-, box- and free-shaped input zonotopes. For robustness verification, we measure
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Epsilon
0
20
40
60
80
100
Sa
m
pl
es
[%
]
Robustness Certificate (cancer, cube)
RsO
wk
dz
dp
dr
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Epsilon
0
20
40
60
80
100
Sa
m
pl
es
[%
]
Robustness Certificate (mnist, box)
RsO
wk
dz
dp
dr
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Epsilon
0
20
40
60
80
100
Sa
m
pl
es
[%
]
Robustness Certificate (iris, free)
RsO
wk
dz
dp
dr
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Epsilon
0
20
40
60
Sa
m
pl
es
[%
]
Non-Robustness Certificate (cancer, cube)
RsU
fgsm
pgd
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Epsilon
0
25
50
75
100
Sa
m
pl
es
[%
]
Non-Robustness Certificate (mnist, box)
RsU
fgsm
pgd
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Epsilon
0
10
20
30
40
Sa
m
pl
es
[%
]
Non-Robustness Certificate (iris, free)
RsU
fgsm
pgd
Figure 4: Comparison of (non-)robustness verification on MNIST.
the number of samples for which the scores against all non-target classes are positive. For non-
robustness verification, we count the number of samples in which a negative score exists against a
class. In the cube and box settings, RsO perform similar way to dr, dz and dp, while RsU is similar
(cube) or slightly better (box) than PGD attacks. Based on arbitrary input zonotopes (free setting),
RsO and RsU outperform both state-of-the-art robustness verification approaches and PGD attacks.
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Figure 5: Class specific verification.
A detailed comparison between the cube,
box and free settings, run-times and fur-
ther experimental results on other data sets
such as FashionMNIST are given in the
Appendix. Since es [29], which computes
the exact reachable set, requires too much
time even with the smallest neural network
architecture (see Appendix), we could not
include it in our comparison.
Classification: Class-Specific Verifica-
tion. Robustness scores allow class-
specific (non-)robustness verification in
cases where distinguishing between classes
is not equally important, e.g. in the tissue data set (3 hidden layers). The authors are of the opinion
that distinguishing between the class 3, 4 or 5 is of minor importance, while it is crucial to distinguish
these classes from class 1. This is illustrated in Figure 5, where classes 3, 4 and 5 are not robust
against each other, while class 1 is robust against all other classes (plot: percentage of instances which
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are evaluated as (non-)robust; x-axis: ground truth class, y-axis: class we test against). Class-specific
analysis allows classifiers to be evaluated more specifically and focus on crucial robustness properties.
Classification: Reliability of Predictions. How can we distinguish between reliable and non-
reliable predictions if the label is not known, e.g. during test time? We propose an ap-
proach called θ-robustness, which does not require label information and is inspired by the
following observation: while a wrong prediction (w.r.t. ground truth) can theoretically have
a high robustness score, we have noticed that robustness scores corresponding to wrongly
predicted inputs are mostly negative or close to zero. Thus, we consider inputs as reliable
if their scores (w.r.t. the predicted class) are larger than a threshold θ; they are θ-robust.
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Figure 6: θ-robustness
To define a good threshold θ we first compute robustness scores for
the whole data set (including wrongly predicted points). Then we
compute the true-above-rate (TAR) and the false-above-rate (FAR)
for different thresholds θ: TAR(θ) = No. corr. pred., θ−rob. pointsNo. corr. pred. points ,
FAR(θ) = No. wrong. pred., θ−rob. pointsNo. wrong. pred. points . These rates are inspired
by true-positive/false-positive rates used in receiver operating char-
acteristic curves (ROC). The threshold θ is chosen such that it
maximizes TAR and minimizes FAR. Figure 6 illustrates several
tested thresholds on Fashion-MNIST (1 hidden layer). According
to θ-robustness verification with θ = 2.0 of the test set, 87.0 % of
correctly classified samples are identified as reliable while 87.5 %
of wrongly classified samples are identified as non-reliable. Thus, θ-robustness makes it possible to
differentiate between reliable and non-reliable predictions if the label of an input is unknown.
Classification: Robust Training. The robustness scores as defined in Equation 7 are directly used
in robust training by incorporating them into the loss function, e.g. as follows:
Lrob = Lpred + I[pred = target] ·max
b
ReLU (−sb) (8)
where Lpred is the cross-entropy loss and I[pred = target] = 1 for correctly classified inputs,
otherwise 0. Note that the loss is fully differentiable w.r.t. the neural network weights (i.e. we can
backpropagate through the zonotope construction) which makes it possible to train a model with
enhanced robustness against any perturbation that can be described by any (input) zonotope. Figure 7
shows that robust training (Lrob) or retraining (warm-start with a normally trained model, further
training with Lrob) against box-shaped perturbations (ε = 0.05, FashionMNIST, 1 hidden layer)
enhances the robustness of the neural network. The accuracy of the models and the mean training
time of an epoch are as follows: normal 91 %, 0.0007s, retrain 91 %, 0.16s, robust 89 %, 0.22s.
Thus, robust training enhances robustness w.r.t. cube-, box- and free-shaped perturbations without
decreasing accuracy.
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Figure 7: Evaluation of robust training against box-shaped inputs on FashionMNIST.
Regression: (Non-)Robustness Analysis and Robust Training. Obtaining robust neural networks
is desirable in any task but has mainly been studied for the purpose of classification. Classifiers are
robust if an input x and all points in its neighborhood are assigned to the same label. In regression
tasks, there is no equivalent robustness definition, because outputs are continuous and not categorical.
However, intuitively, regression models are robust if close inputs result in close outputs. Assume that
inputs and outputs are standardized before training, such that all features are on an equal scale. The
extension la of output feature awithin the reachable setRS quantifies robustness: the smaller la is, the
more robust is the model. The extension is defined by the two most distant points u and v within RS
w.r.t. dimension a: la = |maxu∈RS ua −minv∈RS va|. For input features, the extension lin is
equivalently defined on the input set. In the cube setting, lin is the same for all input features.
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If we have la ≤ lin for all output features a, the regression model maps close inputs to close outputs
and we consider it as robust. We use this robustness definition to define a robust training function
based on feature extension and a standard loss function Lval (e.g. Huber loss):
Lrob = Lval + ReLU
(
max
a
la − lin
)
(9)
If la is larger than lin the second term of Lrob is positive, otherwise it is zero. We compare three
different training modes: normal (training with Huber loss), retrain (warm-start with a normally
trained model, and further training with Lrob) and robust (training with Lrob). Figure 8 illustrates
the training and robustness analysis of the three regression models obtained, based on the abalone
data set (2 hidden layers). Robust training (retrain or robust) results in smaller reachable sets and
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Figure 8: Robust training and analysis of regression models.
thus ensures that close inputs are mapped to close outputs. The mean Huber loss error on the abalone
test set are: normal 0.20, retrain 0.24 and robust 0.24. Thus, robust training improves robustness
properties without significantly reducing prediction accuracy. A discussion of the run-time of the
robustness analysis, robust training and further experimental results is given in the Appendix.
This robustness definition, analysis and robust training proposed for regression models can be applied
to any network. For illustration a case study on an autoencoder is provided in the Appendix.
Explainability: Feature Ranking for Classifiers & Regression Models. Reachable sets enable
the importance of features to be quantified w.r.t. a model output. To quantify the influence of
feature f1, we define a box-shaped input set with a large perturbation δ on f1, while the pertur-
bation on the remaining features is small. The size of the reachable set corresponding to Zˆf1
captures the variation in the predictions caused by varying f1 and thus quantifies the influence of f1.
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Figure 9: Feature ranking.
Since the exact size/volume
of Zˆf1 is inefficient to com-
pute [7], we approximate it
using the interval hull. Here,
we use the scaled version of
the volume that considers the
dimensionality d of the zonotope:
V (IH(Z)) = (2
∏
i δgi)
1
d where
δg =
∑
i |gi|. The volume of
the reachable set is approximated
by the sum of all interval hull
volumes. Figure 9 illustrates the feature ranking for the classes 0 and 1 of the wine data set (13
features, 1 hidden layer). As demonstrated, our model enables features to be ranked w.r.t. the
considered class while being stable w.r.t. the input size δ of the zonotope.
5 Conclusion
We propose RsO and RsU as two efficient approaches for over- and under-approximating the reachable
sets of ReLU networks. Approximated reachable sets are applicable to the analysis of neural network
properties: we analyze and enhance the (non-)robustness properties of both classifiers and regression
models. Our approach outperforms PGD attacks as well as state-of-the-art methods of verification for
classifiers with respect to non-norm bound perturbations. Reachable sets provide more information
than a binary robustness certificate. We use this information for class-specific verification, robustness
quantification, robust training, distinguishing between reliable and non-reliable predictions, and
ranking features according to their influence on a prediction.
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7 Appendix – Reachable Sets of Classifiers & Regression Models:
(Non-)Robustness Analysis and Robust Training
7.1 Proof: Projection of Zonotopes
Recall that projecting a zonotope results in a more compact representation but does not change the
output set (Theorem 1):
Theorem. Let Z be an arbitrary zonotope and Z ′ = ProjRneg(Z), then ReLU(Z) = ReLU(Z
′).
Proof. Applying ReLU and the projection operator to Z results in the following sets:
ReLU (Z) = {a | ad = max{0, bd}, b ∈ Z}
ProjRneg (Z) =
{
q | qd =
{
0 if d ∈ Rneg
pd else
, p ∈ Z
}
=
{
q | qd =
{
0 if ∀p ∈ Z : pd < 0
pd else
, p ∈ Z
}
It holds that:
ReLU
(
ProjRneg (Z)
)
=
{
a | ad = max{0, bd}, b ∈ ProjRneg (Z)
}
= {a | ad = max{0, qd},
qd =
{
0 if ∀r ∈ Z : rd ≤ 0
pd else
, p ∈ Z
}
= {a | ad = max{0, pd}, p ∈ Z} = ReLU (Z)
7.2 Proof: Over-approximation of Zonotopes
Remember how we over-approximate a subset Sk (Theorem 2):
Theorem. Let Z = (c | G), Sk = {p | p ∈ Z ∧ pd ≥ 0 ∀d /∈ Rk ∧ pd ≤ 0 ∀d ∈ Rk}
and Zˆk = (cˆ | Gˆ) with the center cˆ and generators as defined in Equation 5. Then Sk ⊆ Zˆk.
Proof. Let p ∈ Sk. Since p ∈ Z it exists βj ∈ [−1, 1] such that:
p = c+
∑
j
βjgj = cˆ−
∑
j
sj(1− αj)ojgj +
∑
j
β′jojgj
= cˆ+
∑
j
(β′j − sj(1− αj))ojgj = cˆ+
∑
j
β′j − sj(1− αj)
αj
oj gˆj
(10)
where we use that oj =
gj,d∗
|gj,d∗ | ∈ {−1, 1}, β′j = ojβj , c = cˆ−
∑
j sj(1− αj)ojgj and gj = 1αi gˆj .
If we can show that
β′j−sj(1−αj)
αj
oj ∈ [−1, 1] then p ∈ Zk. To this end, we distinguish how αj is
obtained: If αj is computed based on d∗ /∈ Rk then sj = 1 and it holds that 2(1 − αj) − 1 ≤ β′j
(see Theorem 4). If αj is computed based on d∗ ∈ Rk then sj = −1 and β′j ≤ 1 − 2(1 − αj)
(see Theorem 5). With these constraints and β′j ∈ [−1, 1] (from the definition of zonotopes) we
obtain
β′j−sj(1−αj)
αj
∈ [−1, 1]. Using oj ∈ {−1, 1}, we define βˆj = β
′
j−sj(1−αj)
αj
oj and obtain
p = cˆ+
∑
j βˆj gˆj ∈ Zˆk ⇒ ∀p ∈ Sk : p ∈ Zˆk and Sk ⊆ Zˆk.
Theorem 4. Consider zonotope Z = (c | G). Let Sk = {p | p ∈ Z ∧ pd ≥ 0 ∀d /∈ Rk ∧ pd ≤
0 ∀d ∈ Rk} and let Zˆk be a zonotope with the center and generators defined in Equation 5. Consider
the definitions used in Theorem 2. Then 2(1− αj)− 1 ≤ β′j if αj corresponds to a d /∈ Rk.
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Proof. We use that for a point p ∈ Z : pd ≥ 0 in case d /∈ Rk and t+j,d < 0.
0 ≤ pd (11)
⇔ t+j,d + 2
1
2
|t+j,d|
|gj,d| |gj,d| ≤ cd +
∑
i
βigi,d (12)
⇔ t+j,d + 2(1− αj)|gj,d| ≤ cd +
∑
i
βigi,d (13)
⇔ cd +
∑
i
|gi,d| − 2 |gj,d|+ 2(1− αj)|gj,d| ≤ cd +
∑
i
βigi,d (14)
⇔
∑
i,i6=j
oi,dgi,d − |gdj |+ 2(1− αj)|gj,d| ≤
∑
i,i6=j
βigi,d + βjgj,d (15)
⇔
∑
i,i 6=j
(odi − βi)gi,d + (2(1− αj)− 1)|gj,d| ≤ β′j |gj,d| (16)
⇔ 1|gj,d|
∑
i,i6=j
(oi,d − βi)gi,d︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+(2(1− αj)− 1) ≤ β′j (17)
⇒ 2(1− αj)− 1 ≤ β′j (18)
We use that pd = cd +
∑
i βigi,d (12), from the definitions of t
+
j,d 1− αj,d =
|t+j,d|
2|gj,d| if t
+
j,d < 0 and
0 else (13), the definition of t+j,d (14), oj,dgj,d = |gj,d| (15) and βjgj,d = β′j |gj,d| (16). Inequality
1
|gj,d|
∑
i,i 6=j(oi,d − βi)gi,d ≥ 0 (17) holds because oi,dgi,d = |gi,d| and βigi,d = ±βi|gi,d| ≤ |gi,d|
because βi ∈ [−1, 1]⇒ (oi,d − βi)gi,d ≥ 0 and thus,
∑
i,i6=j(oi,d − βi)gi,d ≥ 0.
Theorem 5. Consider zonotope Z = (c | G). Let Sk = {p | p ∈ Z ∧ pd ≥ 0 ∀d /∈ Rk ∧ pd ≤
0 ∀d ∈ Rk} and let Zˆk be a zonotope with the center and generators defined in Equation 5. Consider
the definitions used in Theorem 2. Then β′j ≤ 1− 2(1− αj) if αj corresponds to a d ∈ Rk.
Proof. We use that for a point p ∈ Z : pd ≤ 0 in case d ∈ Rk and t−j,d > 0.
0 ≥ pd (19)
⇔ t−j,d − 2
1
2
|t−j,d|
|gj,d| |gj,d| ≥ cd +
∑
i
βigi,d (20)
⇔ t−j,d − 2(1− αj)|gj,d| ≥ cd +
∑
i
βigi,d (21)
⇔ cd −
∑
i
|gi,d|+ 2 |gj,d| − 2(1− αj)|gj,d| ≥ cd +
∑
i
βigi,d (22)
⇔ −
∑
i,i 6=j
oi,dgi,d + |gj,d| − 2(1− αj)|gj,d| ≥
∑
i,i6=j
βigi,di+ βjgj,d (23)
⇔
∑
i,i6=j
(−oi,d − βi)gi,d + (1− 2(1− αj))|gj,d| ≥ β′j |gj,d| (24)
⇔ 1|gj,d|
∑
i,i 6=j
(−oi,d − βi)gi,d︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+(1− 2(1− αj)) ≥ β′j (25)
⇒ 1− 2(1− αj) ≥ β′j (26)
We use that pd = cd +
∑
i βigi,d (20), from the definitions of t
−
j,d: 1 − αj,d =
|t−j,d|
2|gj,d| if t
−
j,d > 0
and 0 else (21), the definition of t−j,d (22), oj,dgj,d = |gj,d| (23) and βjgj,d = β′j |gdj | (24). Inequality
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1
|gj,d|
∑
i,i 6=j(−oi,d−βi)gi,d ≤ 0 (25) holds because oi,dgi,d = |gi,d| and βigi,d = ±βi|gi,d| ≤ |gi,d|
because βi ∈ [−1, 1]⇒ (−oi,d − βi)gi,d ≤ 0 and thus,
∑
i,i 6=j(−oi,d − βi)gi,d ≤ 0.
7.3 Proof: Under-approximation of Zonotopes
Recall how we under-approximate a subset Sk (Theorem 3):
Theorem. Let Zˆk be computed from zonotope Z based on α∗, δ∗ (Equation 7). Then Zˆk ⊆ Sk.
Proof. Let γi = δi1−αi . Since |δi| ≤ 1 − αi it holds that γi ∈ [−1, 1]. Since p ∈ Zˆk βˆi ∈ [−1, 1]
exists:
p = cˆ+
∑
i
βˆigˆi = c+
∑
i
δigi +
∑
i
βˆiαigi
= c+
∑
i
γi (1− αi) gi +
∑
i
βˆiαigi = c+
∑
i
(
(1− αi) γi + αiβˆi
)
gi
To prove that p ∈ Z we need to show that (1− αi) γi + αiβˆi ∈ [−1, 1]. Considering γi ∈ [−1, 1],
αi ∈ [0, 1] and βˆi ∈ [−1, 1] we obtain:
∀i : (1− αi) γi + αiβˆi ≥ − (1− αi)− αi = −1
∀i : (1− αi) γi + αiβˆi ≤ (1− αi) + αi = 1
Thus, we define βi = (1− αi) γi + αiβˆi and obtain p = c +
∑
i βigi and thus, Zˆk ⊆ Z. The
constraints cˆd −
∑
i |gˆi,d| ≥ 0∀d /∈ Rk and cˆd +
∑
i |gˆi,d| ≤ 0∀d ∈ Rk ensure that Zˆ is located in
the desired quadrant:
pd = cˆd +
∑
i
βˆi ˆgi,d ≥ cˆd −
∑
i
|gˆi,d| ≥ 0 if d /∈ Rk
pd = cˆd +
∑
i
βˆi ˆgi,d ≤ cˆd +
∑
i
|gˆi,d| ≤ 0 if d ∈ Rk
Thus, Zˆk ⊆ Sk.
7.4 Computation of R, Rk and the corresponding Sk
Recall the approximation of ReLU(Z) and the three cases illustrated in Section 3 (Approximation of
ReLU(Z)). In the following, we provide an example how to compute R, Rk and the corresponding
Sk.
Example 1. Consider zonotope Z = (c | G) (Figure 2), where c = (6, 1) and generators are
g1 = (3, 0), g2 = (2, 3) and g3 = (0, 0.5). The lower bounds are (1,−2.5), the upper bounds
are (11, 4.5). As all upper bounds are positive, we do not project any dimension. The index set
considering case 3 is R = {2}. We need to approximate all subsets Sk corresponding to Rk ∈ P(R).
The empty set corresponds to the positive quadrant.
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7.5 Extension of RsO and RsU for Large Neural Networks
For large input sets, the number of convex subsets that define the reachable set of a neural network
scales exponentially with the number of neurons. Let us consider zonotope Z = (c | G), c ∈
Rd, G ∈ Rn×d. In the worst case, Z consists of points that are spread over all 2d quadrants. In
this case, RsO and RsU approximate each convex subset Sk located in one quadrant by a separate
zonotope Zk. Each of these zonotopes Zk is an input of the next layer and in the worst case it
amplifies the same way as Z.
To apply reachable set computation on large neural networks, we extend our RsO and RsU approach
by restricting the overall number of zonotopes by B and the amplification by A. In this context,
amplification refers to the number of zonotopes that are used to approximate the convex subsets Sk
corresponding to ReLU(Z), i.e. to one zonotope Z. The amplification is defined by the number
of quadrants that contain points of Z. The number of quadrants q that contain points of Z can be
computed as follows. First, we compute the interval hull of Z. With respect to dimension d, all points
within Z are in the interval
[
ldlow, l
d
upp
]
= [cd − δgd, cd + δgd], where δg =
∑
i |gi|. Next we count
the number Rn of dimensions d where ldlow < 0 and l
d
upp > 0. The number of quadrants is q = 2
Rn .
We distinguish between two cases: over-approximation and under-approximation. In the first case,
we over-approximate ReLU(Z) by computing its interval hull and restricting the intervals to the
positive portion if q > A. Thus, we over-approximate ReLU(Z) by one convex set instead of q sets.
If the overall number of zonotopes becomes larger than B, we approximate the size of each zonotope,
keep the largest B − 1 zonotopes and union the others over-approximately. As size measure, we use
the extension of the interval hull of Z = (c | G):
size (Z) =
∑
d
log(δg)d, δg =
∑
i
|gi|. (27)
The union of a set of zonotopes is over-approximated by the interval hull of each zonotope and by
minimizing/maximizing over the lower/upper limits of the interval hull. The resulting interval is then
transformed into the G-representation of a zonotope:
llow = min
Zk
(ck − (δg)k), lupp = max
Zk
(ck + (δg)k)
Zuni = (llow + gext | diag(gext)), gext = 0.5(lupp − llow)
(28)
where diag(gext) is a diagonal matrix.
In the second case, we obtain an under-approximation by dropping zonotopes if q > A or the overall
number of zonotopes becomes larger than B. Thus, we consider a subset of the quadrants, keep the
largest under-approximations and drop the others.
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7.6 Details of the Experimental Setup
To evaluate the performance of our reachable set computations, we apply them to robustness and
non-robustness verification and robust training and use them to quantify feature importance and
to compute trust indicators for predictions. Our approaches are implemented in Python/Pytorch.
We train feed-forward ReLU networks using stochastic gradient descent with cross-entropy loss
(classifiers), Huber loss (regression models), mean-square-error loss (autoencoder models) or robust
loss functions, as defined in the main paper, and early stopping. Experiments are carried out on
the following popular data sets and neural network architectures (accuracy denotes worst accuracy
obtained for this data set by one of the specified neural network architectures): Classifiers: Iris
[3, 2]: 3 classes, 4 features, 1 − 5 hidden layers of 4 neurons each, accuracy ≥ 96.7 %. Wine
[4, 2]: 3 classes (cultivars), 13 features, 1− 4 hidden layers of 6 neurons each, accuracy ≥ 96.7 %.
Tissue [11, 2]: breast tissue probes, 6 classes, 9 features, 1 − 3 hidden layers of 8 neurons each,
accuracy ≥ 70.0 %. Breast cancer Wisconsin (diagnostic) [24, 2]: 2 classes, 30 features, 1 − 2
hidden layers of 10 neurons each, accuracy ≥ 96.5 %. MNIST [14]: 28× 28 gray-scale images, 10
classes, 1 hidden layer of 15 neurons, accuracy≥ 94.0 %. Fashion-MNIST [30]: 28×28 gray-scale
images, 10 classes, 1 hidden layer of 15 neurons, accuracy of 92.0 %. Regression Models: Abalone
[27]: 8 features, 1 output, 1− 3 hidden layers of 6 neurons each. Housing [9]: 13 features, 1 output,
1 hidden layer of 13 neurons. Airfoil [26]: 5 features, 1 output, 1 − 4 hidden layers of 5 neurons
each. Autoencoder: MNIST [14]: 28 × 28 gray scale images, 28 × 28 output, 3 hidden layers
of 30×60×30 neurons. Fashion-MNIST [30]: 28×28 gray scale images, 28×28 output, 3 hidden
layers of 30× 60× 30 neurons.
For classification, all data sets are balanced by sub-sampling training- and test-sets such that evaluation
experiments are done on the same amount of points for each class. The input size of MNIST and
Fashion-MNIST is reduced from 28× 28 to 30 by using principle component analysis (PCA). In the
evaluation experiments, we use 30 input points of the iris data set, wine data set and tissue data set, 86
points of the cancer data set, 200 point of the MNIST data set and 100 points of the Fashion-MNIST
data set, which are not part of the training set.
Experiments are conducted in Python (version 3.6) on a machine with 10 Intel Xeon CPU cores with
2.2 GHz, 4 GEFORCE GTX 1080 Ti and 256 GB of RAM running Ubuntu (version 16.04.6).
7.6.1 Detailed Definition of Input Sets
Using zonotopes as input sets has the advantage that we are able to verify different kinds of per-
turbations. Here, the input set Zˆ = (cˆ | Gˆ) is defined by using an input data point x as center cˆ
and the following perturbations specified by the generator matrix Gˆ. Cube: Zˆcube is a hyper-cube
whose shape is equivalent to the unit ball of the L∞-norm. As the allowed perturbation on each input
feature is the same, the generator matrix is εId for different ε. Box: Zˆbox is a so called axis-aligned
parallelotope (n-dimensional box). This shape allows different disturbances on each input feature,
but it does not couple features. For this, we first compute a zonotope by using the eigen-vectors that
correspond to the d largest eigenvalues of the data set as generators. Zbox is obtained by computing
the interval hull of this zonotope and scaling its volume such that it is equivalent to the volume of
Zˆcube for a given ε. Free: Zˆfree is an arbitrary zonotope that enables disturbances to be coupled
between input features which cannot be captured by norms or intervals. This input zonotope is
obtained by increasing/decreasing all feature values simultaneously by at most ε and additionally
allowing a small, fixed perturbation δ  ε on each feature. If the input is an image, this perturbation
would brighten/darken all pixel values simultaneously: Gˆ = [δId, ε~1].
For feature rankings, the following setting was used: to quantify the influence of feature f1 on the
prediction of x, we define a box-shaped input set Zˆf1 = (x|G) around x that allows a perturbation δ
on f1 and a minimal perturbation ε (here: ε = 0.01) on all other features. More formally, we use a
diagonal input matrix G, where G1,1 = δ and Gi,i = ε ∀i 6= 1.
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7.7 Further Experimental Results: Classifiers
Comparison with Exact Reachable Set Computations. It was not possible to conduct a meaningful
comparison with method es [29, 15] that computes the exact reachable set of a neural network, since
it only ran on the smallest neural network (iris data set, neural network with 1 hidden layer of 4
neurons) for the smallest ε ∈ {0.001, 0.005, 0.01}. When performing the exact method es on a
cube-shape input with perturbation ε = 0.02, it did not finish even after more than three days. This
might be explained by the fact that es uses half-spaces to describe the reachable set. Applying ReLU
on sets described by half-spaces requires exponential time, and thus, es is not feasible even for small
neural networks. Consequently, the reachable set needs to be over-/under-approximated as in our
approach.
Run-times and numbers of verified samples of our approaches RsO, RsU and of the exact method es
are shown in Table 1. Note that we used a version of [15] in which a previously existing bug in an
underlying library has been fixed. This fix is crucial for correctness, but results in longer run-times
than originally reported in [15, 29].
ε RsO RsU es
No. robust Time [ms] No. non-robust Time [ms] No. robust No. non-robust Time [ms]
0.001 29 0.47 0 0.46 28 0 14.68
0.005 29 0.46 0 0.47 28 0 14.56
0.01 29 0.47 0 0.46 28 0 14.61
0.02 29 0.58 0 2.40 - - not finished > 3d
Table 1: Comparison of RsO and RsU with the exact reachable set computation (es) [29, 15] on 29
correctly classified samples of the iris data set (neural network with 1 hidden layer of 4 neurons, cube
setting).
Note that the exact approach es certifies 28 of the 29 samples as robust and 0 as non-robust and
rejects one sample for which it was not able to solve an underlying optimization problem.
(Non-)Robustness Verification of Classifiers. Detailed numbers on the verification of a classifier
trained on Fashion-MNIST are given in Figure 10. On cube- and box-shaped inputs, RsO and
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Figure 10: Performance evaluation of RsO and RsU in (non-)robustness verification on Fashion-
MNIST using different input sets/perturbations.
RsU perform in a similar way to the state-of-the-art verification techniques dz, dp, dr and PGD
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attacks. If we use input sets that allow features to be coupled (free-setting), RsO and RsU outperform
dz, dp, dr and PGD attacks. The run-time of RsO and RsU increases with the number of input
features, the number of neurons in the neural network and the perturbation ε. The dependency on ε is
due to the fact that huge sets usually decompose into more convex subsets than smaller sets when
they are subject to ReLU, and so, run-time increases with the size of the input set. Note that we
compute the full reachable set of the neural network, which provides much more information than
a binary (non-)robustness-certificate. The other techniques, dz, dp, dr are designed for robustness
verification/attacks and do not return any further information. A run-time comparison is thus biased.
Still, for smaller ε and also for the free-shaped input, the absolute run-time of our methods is
competitive.
Class-specific Verification. Class-specific robustness verification allows us to draw conclusions
about the concepts a neural network has learned (see Figure 11 Fashion-MNIST with classes: 0 top, 1
trousers, 2 pullover, 3 dress, 4 coat, 5 sandal, 6 shirt 7 sneaker, 8 bag, 9 boot). It is striking that class
2 pullover is less robust against classes of items of a similar shape (0 top, 4 coat) but robust against
classes of items of different shapes (1 trousers, 3 dress, 5 sandal, 8 bag, 9 boot). This indicates that
the neural network has extracted the shape and learned its importance for a classification decision.
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Figure 11: Class specific (non-)robustness verification on the Fashion-MNIST data set.
17
7.8 Further Experimental Results: Regression Models
In this section we further demonstrate the performance of RsO and RsU in robust training and analysis
of regression models (Figure 12).
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Figure 12: Robust training and robustness analysis on the airfoil data set (RsO: solid lines, RsU:
dashed lines).
We use three different training procedures: normal (normally trained neural network), retrain (warm
start with normally trained model, further training with the robust loss function) and robust (training
with the robust loss function, which is defined in the main section of this paper). Experiments are
carried out on a neural network with one hidden layer and we train against cube-shaped perturbations
of size ε = 0.05. The mean time of a training epoch is 1.09ms for normal training, 5.60ms for
retraining and 9.47ms for robust training.
Our evaluation illustrates two aspects: First, our approximations are tight, since the extensions of
the reachable sets computed by RsU (dashed lines) and RsO (solid lines) are close. Second, robust
training improves the robustness properties of regression models, since the under-approximated
reachable sets of the normal model are larger than the over-approximated reachable sets of the
robustly trained models.
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7.9 Further Experimental Results: Autoencoder Models
To illustrate the strength of our approach, we compare reachable sets obtained by our extended
RsO and RsU approach (see Section 7.5) with a sampling-based set approximation. To do this,
we approximate the reachable set of an autoencoder (three hidden layers, 60 × 30 × 60 neurons)
with respect to a cube shaped input set with ε = 0.001. RsO and RsU are restricted such that the
maximum amplification of a zonotope is A = 100 and the overall number of zonotopes is less or
equal to B = 1000. The sampling approach chooses 109 points among the vertices of the cube
shaped input set and computes the corresponding outputs. The set spanned by these 109 outputs is
used to approximate the exact reachable set.
Since we consider autoencoder models, the reachable set consists of pictures from the same space
as the input. To compare the properties of the reachable sets computed by RsO, by RsU and by the
sampling approach, we draw example pictures from the reachable sets. Furthermore, we compute the
extension/size of the range of each pixel based on the reachable set under consideration (Figure 13).
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Figure 13: Analysis of an autoencoder (MNIST, cube, ε = 0.001). First row: input image, perturbed
input, corresponding output image. Second row: output image drawn from the reachable set approxi-
mated by RsO (left), RsU (middle) and sampling (right). Third row: extension/size of the pixel range
corresponding to the reachable sets computed by RsO (left), RsU (middle) and sampling (right).
Even though we restrict the number of convex subsets to 1000, RsO and RsU result in similar
example pictures and similar extensions for each pixel (see Figure 13, second row and third row).
This illustrates that our approximations are tight and close to the exact reachable set, as the exact
reachable set is enclosed by the under-approximation and the over-approximation. In comparison
to RsU, the sampling approach results in pixel extensions that are about two times smaller and
example pictures that are close to the image reconstructed from the original input. Thus, sampling
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109 vertices from the input set and computing the corresponding outputs under-estimates the exact
reachable set. This shows that RsU outperforms the sampling approach, even if we restrict the overall
number of zonotopes and the possible amplification. In conclusion, these results highlight the fact that
computing an upper bound (RsO) and a lower bound (RsU) to the reachable set of neural networks
provides more information on the mapping of networks than sampling.
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